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CRIMINAL LAW
THE AFTERMATH OF FURMAN: THE FLORIDA EXPERIENCE
The Supreme Court's decision abolishing the death penalty, at least as it existed in most jurisdic-
tions, hardly represents the final resolution of the controversy over capital punishment. Given sub-
stantial public sentiment which apparently favors capital punishment in some form-voiced, for
example, in the results of the recent referendum in California-various legislative bodies will face
the question of whether capital punishment can and should be legislatively reinstated. In December
1972 the State of Florida became the first jurisdiction to pass judgment on this question. The legisla-
ture enacted a bill allowing imposition of the death penalty in certain circumstances.
The two articles which follow highlight the competing policy and legal considerations which face
legislatures after Furman, and illustrate one state's response to those considerations. The first article
is a slightly revised version of a memorandum to the Florida Governor's Committee to Study Capital
Punishment, submitted by the Committee's Legal Advisory Staff. It sketches the various possible
legislative responses to Furman and recommends one. The second indicates other recommendations
made to the legislators and comments on the ultimate legislative determination.
I. THE FUTURE OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN FLORIDA: ANALYSIS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS*
CHARLES W. EHRHARDT,** PHILLIP A. HUBBART,t L. HAROLD LEVINSON,tt
WILLIAM McKINLEY SMILEY, j.t AND THOMAS A. WILLStj
The purpose of this memorafidum is to advise
the Florida Governor's Committee to Study
Capital Punishment regarding the consitutional
* The original text of this memorandum was pre-
pared at the request of the Honorable E. Harris Drew,
Chairman of the Florida Governor's Committee to
Study Capital Punishment, for submission to a meeting
of the Committee at Tallahassee on October 20, 1972.
The writers were appointed by Governor Reubin
Askew, after consultation with the deans of the four
law schools in Florida, to serve as legal advisors to the
Committee.
This memorandum reflects the personal views of
the authors, and should not be attributed to any of the
institutions with which they are affiliated.
Although the version which appears here does not
deviate significantly from that which was submitted
to the Committee, it was necessary to alter that text
slightly so as to make this article and the one following
more understandable and useful to the non-Florida
reader. An unedited copy of the memorandum is in-
cluded in FINAL REPORT OF THE [FLA.] GOVERNOR'S
CosnnnxTE TO STUDY CAPITAL. PUNISMENT (Nov. 21,
1972).
** B.S., Iowa State University; J.D., University of
Iowa; Associate Professor of Law, Florida State Uni-
versity.
t A.B., Augustana College; LL.B., Duke University;
Instructor in Law, University of Miami; Public De-
fender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida.
tt B.B.A., LL.B., University of Miami; LL.M., New
York University; Professor of Law, University of
Florida.
SA.B., Duke University; LL.B., Emory University;
LL.M., University of Miami; Associate Professsor of
Law, Stetson University.
effects of the decision rendered by the Supreme
Court of the United States on June 29, 1972, in
Furman v. Georgia.'
The five-man majority in Furman agreed on a
one-paragraph decision reversing the judgments
of the courts of Georgia and Texas and holding
that "the imposition and carrying out of the death
penalty in these cases constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth and Four-
teenth Amendments." 2 In addition to the per
curiam opinion, the Furman decision includes nine
separate opinions in which each Justice of the
majority and minority expresses his own views.
Following Furman, the Florida supreme court
ruled in Donaldson v. Sack3 that capital punishment
no longer exists in Florida, since Furman invali-
dates Florida's capital punishment laws along with
those of Georgia and Texas. Consequently, capital
punishment cannot constitutionally be imposed
unless Florida statutes are amended, and then only
I B.S., St. Ambrose College; M.S., Iowa State Uni-
versity; J.D., University of Miami; Professor of Law,
University of Miami.
' Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
2408 U.S. at 239-40.
3 265 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 1972). The law as it existed
before this decision is summarized in Erhardt &
Levinson, Florida's Legislatire Response to Furman: An
Exercise in Futility? 64 J. CRan. L. & C. 10 (1973).
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if the amended statutes satisfy the standards re-
quired by Furman. Whether any capital punish-
ment statute could satisfy these standards is, of
course, a crucial question for this Committee.
Our comments inevitably involve prediction
of the manner in which the Supreme Court is
likely to decide future cases. In making these
predictions, we assume that the nine Justices
currently on the Court will continue in office and
that each Justice will decide future cases consist-
ently with the views he expressed in Furman.
SOME OR ALL OF THE TOUR JUSTIcES WHO DIS-
SENTED IN FURMAN ARE LIKELY TO CHANGE
THEIR VOTES IN FUTURE CASES OUT OF RESPECT
FOR THE PRECEDENT ESTABLISHED IN FURIMAN
Dissenting opinions in Furman were written by
Chief Justice Burger and by Justices Blackmun,
Powell and Rehnquist. The underlying theme of all
four dissents is that legislatures, not the courts,
should decide whether capital punishment is an
acceptable penalty. Not a single Justice stated
that he personally favored capital punishment. To
the contrary, Justice Blackmun wrote: "Were I
a legislator, I would vote against the death pen-
alty .... ,, 4 And the Chief Justice, in an opinion
joined by all four dissenters, stated: "If we were
possessed of legislative power, I would either join
with Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Marshall
[who held capital punishment unconstitutional] or,
at the very least, restrict the use of capital punish-
ment to a small category of the most heinous
crimes." I Instead, the four dissenters based their
votes upon their view that the Supreme Court
should not interfere with legislative judgments
about the acceptability of capital punishment.
The Furman majority, however, considered the
question of the wisdom of the legislative judgment
as appropriate for judicial determination. They
reached the question, decided it, and thereby es-
tablished a new precedent. While the full scope of
Frrnan, as precedent, is uncertain in view of the
five separate opinions written by the five Justices
who constituted the majority, one aspect of the
decision is perfectly clear. The five-man majorityj
in their one paragraph opinion, invalidated the
judgments of the Georgia and Texas courts which
had applied their states' respective capital punish-
ment statutes. In so doing, the Supreme Court
necessarily decided that it could and would exer-
4 408 U.S. at 406 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
408 U.S. at 375 (Burger, C. J., dissenting).
cise its authority on this topic, despite the con-
trary arguments of the four dissenters.
Out of respect for this precedent, it is likely that
some or all of the four Justices who dissented in
Furman will consider themselves bound in future
cases to consider the question they refused to
reach in Furnusn. A substantial tradition argues
in favor of this approach. The most notable ad-
vocate of this position in recent years was the late
Justice Harlan, who frequently dissented from
"landmark" decisions of the Supreme Court but
usually changed his vote when similar issues came
to the Court again so as to conform to the prece-
dent established by the majority. 6
Thus, it is unlikely that the vote of five to four
will be repeated in future Supreme Court litigation
involving capital punishment. Now that the
Court's role in this matter has been established by
the Furman precedent, some or all of the four
dissenters in Furman are likely to consider the
question on its merits, and some or all of these
Justices are likely to vote for abolition of capital
punishment, or at least to restrict its use to a small
category of the most heinous crimes.
AN AMENDMENT TO FLORIDA STATUTES REMOVING
JURY DISCRETION TO RECOMMEND MERCY TOR
CERTAIN CAPITAL OFFENSES IS UNLIKELY TO
WITHSTAND CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE
Some legal authorities in Florida, notably the
Attorney General, assert that capital punishment
may be constitutionally reinstated under the
Furman decision if the punishment is made "man-
datory" upon conviction for certain heinous
crimes by removing all jury discretion to recom-
mend mercy
6 As examples of the late Justice Harlan's respect
for precedent, see Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 116
(1964) (Harlan, J., concurring); Griffin v. California,
380 U.S. 609, 615-17 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring);
Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324,327-28 (1969) (Harlan,
J., concurring).
The tendency of the Burger Court to adhere to the
precedents established by the Warren Court is noted
in: Kurland, 1970 Term: Notes on the Emergence of the
Burger Court, in SUPREME COURT RZEviEw 265 (1971);
Kalven, Foreword, The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85
HAv. L. Rv. 3, 5 (1971). On the general topic of
precedent in the Supreme Court, see Boudin, The
Problem of Stare Decisis in our Constitutional Ttheory,
8 N.Y.U.L.Q. 589 (1931); Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49
CoLum. L. REV. 735 (1949); Noland, State Decisis and
the Overriding of Constitutional Decisions in the Warren
Years, 4 VAIaxARASo L. REV. 101 (1969).
7 In his official legal memorandum on the Furman
decision dated July 7, 1972, the Attorney General of
Florida argues strongly that a system of mandatory
death penalties for certain types of homicide may be
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This position is based primarily on the two
crucial concurring opinions of Justices Stewart
and White in Furman. These opinions state that
quite different questions would be presented by a
statute which mandatorily applied the death
penalty to certain types of crimes, and that no
view is expressed regarding the constitutionality
of such a statute.8
It is argued with some persuasiveness that a
system which eliminated the arbitrary application
of capital punishment would in all likelihood be
viewed as consititutional by Justices Stewart and
White. Therefore, the argument concludes that
capital punishment can be constitutionally rein-
stated for certain heinous offenses so long as jury
discretion to recommend mercy is eliminated, and
that Justices Stewart and White, together with the
dissenting Justices in Furman (Burger, C. J., and
Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ.) would
vote to uphold the constitutionality of such a
system. This legal analysis, while appealing on the
surface, is unsound and must be rejected.
First, the position assumes that the four dis-
senting Justices in Furman would uphold the con-
stitutionality of a system of mandatory death
penalties. This assumption is extremely doubtful,
constitutionally reinstituted. Specifically, the Attorney
General suggests that death be mandatorily imposed
as a punishment for the murder of a law enforcement
officer, the murder of any penal institution officer, any
murder pursuant to a contract for profit, any murder
committed or perpetrated during the commission of
any felony directed against another person, any murder
by an assassin or person taking the life of any state
or federal official, any murder committed by a parolee
or probationer previously convicted of first degree
murder, and any murder of a person in connection with
a hijacking of an airplane, bus, train, ship or any other
commercial vehicle.
It has been argued at some hearings of this Com-
mittee, that classifying certain murders as punishable
by death and others punishable by life imprisonment
may violate the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment to the United States Constitution
and article I, section 2 of the Florida Constitution
(1968). This objection is unsound. A legitimate govern-
mental purpose is evident in the proposed legislative
scheme, namely, to punish more severely those heinous-
type murders which, more than other murders, threaten
the peace and safety of the community. Statutory
classifications of this nature are not condemned by the
equal protection clause so long as some legitimate
governmental purpose is served by the classification.
Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969);
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969). How-
ever, it is our ultimate conclusion that a system of
mandatory death penalties cannot be sustained under
the Furman decision.
8 408 U.S. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring); 408 U.S.
at 310-11 (White, J., concurring).
based on statements by the four dissenters in
Furman. Chief Justice Burger, joined by all the
dissenters, makes the following statement in his
opinion:
Real change could clearly be brought about if
legislatures provided mandatory death sentences
in such a way as to deny juries the opportunity
to bring in a verdict on a lesser charge; under such
a system, the death sentence could only be avoided
by a verdict of acquittal. If this is the only alter-
native that the legislatures can safely pursue
under today's ruling, I would have preferred that
the Court opt for abolition.9
Justice Blackmun, in his separate dissenting opin-
ion, states that if legislatures responded to the
Furman.z decision by enacting mandatory capital
punishment without the possibility of imposing
lesser punishments, such legislation would be
"regressive and of an antique mold, for it [would]
eliminate the element of mercy in the imposition
of punishment. I thought we had passed beyond
that point in our criminology long ago." 10 More-
over, as we have previously indicated, some or all
of the dissenting Justices in Furman may change
their votes out of respect for the Furman precedent
and rule unconstitutional any legislation rein-
stating capital punishment.
The concurring opinions of Justices Brennan
and Marshall make it clear that any statutory
scheme to reinstate capital punishment would be
unconstitutional under their interpretation of the
eighth amendment." The views of these Justices
along with the four dissenters would therefore seem
to invalidate any legislative effort to reinstitute
capital punishment on a mandatory basis.
Second, the argument in favor of reinstating
capital punishment through a system of mandatory
death penalties assumes that eliminating jury
discretion to recommend mercy will substantially
eliminate the risk of arbitrary application of capital
punishment, so as to satisfy the constitutional
objections of Justices Stewart and White in
1408 U.S. at 401 (Burger, C. J., dissenting).
10 408 U.S. at 413 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
l'1"When examined by the principles applicable
under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause,
death stands condemned as fatally offensive to human
dignity. The punishment of death is therefore 'cruel
and unusual,' and the states may no longer inflict it
as a punishment for crimes." 408 U.S. at 305 (Bren-
nan, J., concurring); "There is but one conclusion
that can be drawn from all of this-i.e., the death
penalty is an excessive and unnecessary punishment
which violates the Eighth Amendment." 408 U.S. at
358-59 (Marshall, J., concurring).
[Vol. 6
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Furman. This is extremely doubtful. Other areas of
unfettered discretion contribute substantially to
the arbitrary application of capital punishment in
Florida, to wit: executive clemency by the Gover-
nor and pardon board, jury discretion to convict of
lesser included offenses, and "plea bargaining" to
lesser included offenses. Since these areas of discre-
tion would remain intact under a system which
eliminated jury discretion to recommend mercy, it
is highly unlikely that such a system would reduce
the risk of arbitrariness sufficiently to satisfy the
basic constitutional objections of Justices Stewart
and White. Furthermore, any effort to eliminate
these critical areas of discretion would fortify the
position of the four dissenting Justices in Fur-man
who observed that such a system would be so re-
gressive as to be unconstitutional, making total
abolition the only alternative.
In short, it is our considered opinion that any
effort to reinstitute capital punishment on a
mandatory basis for certain heinous offenses by
eliminating jury discretion to recommend mercy is
unlikely to be upheld under the Furman decision.
AN AMENDMENT TO FLORIDA STATUTES PROVIDING
DETAILED GUIDELINES FOR JURY DETERMINA-
TION OF MERCY IS UNLIKELY TO WITHSTAND
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE
In his dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Burger
speculates on the impact of the Court's decision in
Furman, and suggests that legislatures "may seek
to bring their laws into compliance with the Court's
ruling by providing standards for juries and judges
to follow in determining the sentence in capital
cases or by more narrowly defining the crimes for
which the penalty is to be imposed." 12
A tenable argument can be made that a statute
providing detailed guidelines controlling the im-
position of capital punishment would be held valid
by-a majority of the Court, including some Justices
who concurred in Furman as well as some or all of
those who dissented.
Advocates of this approach would point out that
three members of the majority in Furman, Justices
Douglas,"' White and Stewart, do not hold capital
12408 U.S. at 400 (Burger, C. J., dissenting).
'3 Justice Douglas finds the discretionary statutes to
be unconstitutional in their application as the death
penalty was arbitrarily and selectively applied in a
manner inconsistent "with the idea of equal pro-
tection of the laws that is implicit in the ban on 'cruel
and unusual' punishments." 408 U.S. at 257 (Douglas,
J., concurring).
punishment unconstitutional per se, but carefully
limit their concurring opinions to systems where
the decision between life and death for the de-
fendant rests in the complete discretion of the jury.
Vesting complete discretion in the jury without
any guidelines for the imposition of the penalty
causes Justice White to conclude that "there is
no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few
cases in which it is imposed from the many cases in
which it is not." 14 He is also concerned that the
judgment which state legislatures have made re-
garding the death penalty is lost when the jury is
delegated the sentencing authority and can, with-
out violating any trust or statutory policy, refuse
to impose the penalty no matter what the circum-
stances of the crime.
Similarly, Justice Stewart, who finds the death
penalty to be impermissible where it is "wantonly
and freakishly imposed," 15 implies that the death
penalty is not unconstitutional per se when he
recognizes that retribution is a constitutionally
permissible ingredient in the imposition of punish-
ment. The capricious selection by the jury of those
upon whom the sentence of death will be imposed
is Stewart's chief objection to the present sentenc-
ing procedures. Thus, it is arguable that the Court
would uphold capital punishment if imposed in a
manner which eliminates capriciousness and un-
controlled discretion in the sentencing process.
Both the Model Penal Code and the Report of
the National Commission on Reform of Federal
Criminal Laws recommend sentencing procedures
which attempt to define when the death penalty
may be imposed. Each proposal sets forth certain
aggravating and mitigating circumstances which
serve as guidelines for imposing the death penalty."
In order to stand any chance of satisfying constitu-
tional requirements, statutory guidelines must
evidently be made obligatory rather than merely
advisory, otherwise the sentence can still be im-
posed in a completely capricious and arbitrary
manner. 7 The Model Penal Code meets this argu-
14 408 U.S. at 313 (White, 3., concurring).
15 408 U.S. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring).
16 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 (Proposed Official
Draft 1962); REPORT OF Tim NATIONAL COmmissioN
ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRauNAL LAWS, pt. 1, §§
3601-04 (1971). In addition to providing guidelines, a
legislature following this approach should specifically
negate constitutionally impermissible criteria, e.g.,
race. See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 207
(1971).
17 See, &g., In re Anderson, 69 Cal. App. 2d 613, 447
P.2d 117, 73 Cal. Rptr. 21 (1968) (Tobriner, J., dis-
senting). In Donaldson v. Sack, 265 So. 2d 499, 504
19731
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ment by requiring, for the imposition of the death
penalty, a finding of the presence of one of the
enumerated aggravating circumstances and a
further finding that there are no mitigating circum-
stances sufficient to call for leniency.18
Thus, it can be argued that the requirements of
Furman would be satisfied by a statute incorporat-
ing the Model Penal Code approach, requiring
specific findings regarding aggravating or mitigat-
ing circumstances. The sentence would be deter-
mined at a penalty trial, separate from the trial for
determination of guilt. The penalty trial would,
under one view of the matter, be conducted by a
judge without a jury. 19 The specific findings made
at the penalty trial, as well as the sentence imposed
on the basis of these findings, would be subject to
complete appellate review.2
0
While a statute along these lines would un-
doubtedly reduce the scope of the jury's discretion,
in our opinion the statute would be unlikely to
withstand constitutional challenge.
We base this opinion on the same reasons that
led us to conclude, in the preceding section, that a
statute imposing mandatory death penalties would
be unlikely to withstand constitutional challenge.
First, a statute imposing guidelines for jury deter-
mination of mercy, coupled with a requirement of
specific findings and appellate review, might be re-
(Fla. 1972), the Florida Supreme Court did not rule
on the constitutionality of ch. 72-72, [19721 Fla. Sess.
Laws 122, amending FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (1971), pro-
viding for bifurcated trials in capital cases and listing
certain aggravating and mitigating circumstances, since
it was not effective until October 1, 1972. However, the
new statute apparently contains constitutional in-
firmities in that it does not require a finding of the
presence of an aggravating circumstance prior to the
imposition of the death penalty, but rather allows the
jury that same discretion in determining when the
death penalty should be imposed which was con-
demned in Furman. The Florida statute also lacks
the additional requirements discussed in notes 19 and
20 and accompanying text infra.
18 MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 16, at § 210.6(2).
19ABA PROJECt ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR
CIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING To SEN-
TENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES (Approved
Draft, 1968), referring to the judge's role in sentencing,
states: "clearly the most telling argument against jury
sentencing is that a proper sentencing decision calls on
an expertise which a jury cannot possibly be expected
to bring with it to the trial, nor develop for the one
occassion on which it will be used." Id. at 47.
2
0 FINAL REPORT or THE NATIONAL CoMMIsSIoN ON
REFoRM OF THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS 367 (1971)
recommends amendment of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970)
by providing that the jurisdiction of the courts of
"shall in criminal cases include the power to
review the sentence and to modify or set it aside for
further proceedings."
jected by some or all of the Justices who dissented
in Furman, as a "regressive" attempt to divest the
jury of its flexibility and discretion. Second, such a
statute would still leave vast areas of discretion,
including executive clemency, jury discretion to
convict of lesser included offenses, and "plea bar-
gaining" to lesser included offenses. Thus, a sub-
stantial and unacceptable risk of arbitrariness
would remain.
NO STATUTE IMPOSING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT CAN BE
EXPECTED TO WITHSTAND CONSTITUTIONAL CHAL-
LENGE UNLESS ENACTED IN CONTEXT OF FUNDA-
MENTAL CHANGES IN OUR SYSTEM OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE-AND EVEN IF FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES
ARE MADE IN OUR SYSTEM, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT A
CONSTITUTIONAL CAPITAL PUNISHMENT STATUTE
CAN BE ENACTED
We read Furman as requiring extremely reliable
guarantees in capital cases, because of the unique
severity and finality of capital punishment. The
Court leaves open at least the theoretical possibil-
ity of a valid capital punishment statute, but gives
no clear blueprint of an improved system which
could administer capital punishment with an ac-
ceptable degree of reliability.
Our discussion in the previous two sections of
this memorandum indicates that, in our view, the
Court's requirements would probably not be satis-
fied, either by a statute providing mandatory
capital punishment, or by a statute providing de-
tailed guidelines for jury determination of mercy.
An acceptable system would necessarily include
provisions designed to eliminate, as far as humanly
possible, the risk of arbitrary, freakish or dis-
criminatory decision in capital cases, not only in
the jury function, but at all stages of the process
where substantial discretion now exists. Amongst
other stages where discretion is currently exercised,
we direct special attention to the clemency power,
exercised pursuant to the Florida Constitutionl by
the Governor and three members of the cabinet.
Any attempt to make changes in this function
would evidently require amendment of the Florida
Constitution.
In order to design a system of capital punishment
which would have a theoretical chance of with-
standing constitutional challenge, the legislative
draftsman would need inputs from experienced
prosecutors, defense counsel, trial judges, Florida
supreme court justices, and officials of the execu-
21FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 8.
[Vol. 64
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tive department familiar with the exercise of the
clemency power. The assistance of these persons
would be necessary in order to identify the stages
of the process at which substantial discretion cur-
rently exists, to discuss the types of abuse most
likely to occur, and to suggest methods by which
the risk of abuse could be reduced to the stringent
requirements of Furman.
This Committee has not received evidence on
these matters, except for a few passing references
made by some witnesses. We consider it would be
premature, on the basis of the present state of the
Committee's record, for us to offer any recom-
mendations on these matters. We merely note that
no statute imposing capital punishment is likely to
have even a theoretical chance of withstanding
constitutional challenge unless enacted in the con-
text of fundamental changes in our system of
criminal justice.
We have described, as "theoretical," the possi-
bility of drafting a capital punishment statute
which would satisfy the Furman requirements.
This description is based upon a number of con-
siderations which suggest that, while Furman on its
face appears to leave the door open to the enact-
ment of valid capital punishment statutes, the
decision strongly implies that capital punishment
in the United States is a thing of the past.
First, some or all of the four Justices who dis-
sented in Furman may change their votes in future
cases, out of respect for the precedent established
by the Furman majority. We have discussed this
matter in a previous section.
Second, the guarantees needed in order to satisfy
the Furman requirements may be so expensive and
time consuming that no legislature would be willing
to provide them.
Third, Justices Douglas, Stewart and White may
have been motivated to write their separate con-
curring opinions by the desire to condemn arbi-
trary, freakish or discriminatory exercises of dis-
cretion throughout our system of criminal justice.
These three Justices may, in future cases, be pre-
pared to vote against capital punishment, regard-
less of the system under which it may be adminis-
tered; they refrained from taking such a position in
Furman, perhaps in order to focus attention upon
the arbitrary, freakish or discriminatory aspects of
existing systems of imposing punishment, in non-
capital as well as capital cases.
Fourth, it seems unlikely that the United States
Supreme Court would permit reinstatement of
capital punishment in any form in the United
States, with the possible exception of the military,
after having taken the drastic measure of ordering
the release of over 600 convicts from death rows
throughout the country.
FURMAN AND OTHER RECENT DECISIONS SERVE
NOTICE THAT THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT IS READY TO REQUIRE FUNDAMNTAL
CHANGES IN OUR ENTIRE SYSTEM OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE AND CORRECTIONS, WHETHER OR NOT WE
ATTEMPT TO REINSTATE CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
We have pointed out, in the previous section,
that Furman requires extremely reliable guarantees
in capital cases, because of the unique severity and
finality of capital punishment. We have also noted
that some of the concurring opinions in Furman
may be read as condemning the risks of arbitrary,
freakish and discriminatory decision-making
throughout our system of criminal justice and cor-
rections.
Thus, while capital cases demand the most
rigorous guarantees-perhaps so rigorous as to be
impossible of attainment-non-capital cases also
require guarantees, not quite so rigorous as in capi-
tal cases, but in many respects more rigorous than
are currently available.
We read Furman and some other recent decisions
of the United States Supreme Court as strong indi-
cations that the Court is ready to require funda-
mental changes in our entire system of criminal
justice and corrections, whether or not we attempt
to reinstate capital punishment.
The opinions by Justices Douglas, Stewart and
White have already been mentioned, as condemn-
ing the risks of arbitrary, freakish and discrimina-
tory decisions, wherever they may exist in our sys-
tem. Some of the other opinions in Furman support
this view.
For example, Justice Brennan develops a four-
point cumulative test for measuring punishments
against the eighth amendment:u (1) if the punish-
ment is unduly severe; (2) if there is a strong
probability that it will be inflicted arbitrarily; (3) if
it is substantially rejected by contemporary so-
ciety; and (4) if there is no reason to believe that it
serves any penal purpose more effectively than
some less severe punishment. Justice Marshall fol-
lows a similar approach.P Justice White implies
2 408 U.S. at 271-81 (Brennan, J., concurring).
2Id. at 330-32 (Marshall, J., concurring).
1973]
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that a penalty, in order to satisfy constitutional
standards, must demonstrably serve "discernible
social or public purposes." 24
The dissenting Justices express hesitancy about
reaching such questions. Thus, Chief justice
Burger observes that the eighth amendment
"is not addressed to social utility and does not
command that enlightened principles of penology
always be followed." 25 He points out that, "If it
were proper to put the states to the test of demon-
strating the deterrent value of capital punishment,
we could just as well ask them to prove the need
for life imprisonment or any other punishment." 21
However, to the extent that the Furman ma-
jority has indeed opened up this avenue, some or
all of the dissenters may respect Furman as a
precedent for the proposition that the Court should
examine the social utility of punishments in gen-
eral.n And, as the Chief justice puts it, "If any-
where in the whole spectrum of criminal justice
fresh ideas deserve sober analysis, the sentencing
and correctional area ranks high on the list." 28
Our view that Furman calls for legislative recon-
sideration of the entire system of criminal justice
and corrections is reinforced by a number of other
cases decided by the Supreme Court during the
months preceding Furman9 and by the numer-
ous off-the-bench statements made by Chief
Justice Burger advocating drastic reform in many
1 Id. at 312 (White, J., concurring).2 1 Id. at 394 (Burger, C. J., dissenting).
2
6 Id. at 396.
27 See note 6 and accompanying text supra.
28 408 U.S. at 402 (Burger, C. J., dissenting).
29 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (pro-
ceedings for parole revocation must provide certain
minimum due process guarantees); Jackson v. Indiana,
406 U.S. 715 (1972) (Indiana system of pretrial com-
mittment of mentally incompetent defendants held
unconstitutional); McNeal v. Director, Patuxent In-
stitution, 407 U.S. 245 (1972) (inmate confined in-
definitely as defective delinquent held entitled to pro-
cedural safeguards commensurate with long-term im-
prisonment); Murel v. Criminal Court, 407 U.S. 355
(1972) (review of delinquency law refused only because
statute was undergoing substantial revision); Hum-
phrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972) (Wisconsin Sex
Crimes Act held seriously questionable under equal
protection guarantee); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319
(1972) (prisoners have right to participate in religion
of choice); United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972)
(prior invalid convictions must not be considered in
imposing sentence for subsequent crimes); Santobello
v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971) (plea bargain, once
made, must be fulfilled at time of sentencing); Wilword-
ing v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971) (habeas corpus
relief available to prisoners seeking review of living
conditions and discipline without need to exhaust state
remedies).
of these areas. 0 The Burger Court is likely to move
further in these areas than in the trial procedure
area which was a major concern of the Warren
Court.
COMPREHENSIVE STUDY OF ENTIRE SYSTEM OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND CORRECTIONS IS A VITAL
COUNTERPART TO THE WORK OF THIS COMMITTEE
A comprehensive study of our entire system of
criminal justice and corrections is vital for a num-
ber of reasons.
First, as indicated above, Furman and other
recent decisions of the United States Supreme
Court indicate that the Court will require funda-
mental reforms.
10 For many years we neglected the entire spectrum
of criminal justice. Slowly, but with increasing
pace we have corrected procedural inequities.
... In time we must take stock of what we have
done and see whether all of it is wise and useful
and constructive.
Meanwhile we must soon turn increased atten-
tion and resources to the disposition of the
guilty once the fact finding process is over.
Without effective correctional systems an in-
creasing proportion of our population will be-
come chronic criminals with no other way of
life except the revolving door of crime, prison
and more crime.
Address by Chief Justice Burger, American Bar Associ-
ation Convention, Dallas, Texas, Aug. 11, 1969, as
quoted in 39 Gxo. WAsH. L. PEv. 185 (1970).
In 1971, the Chief Justice called criminal correction
the "most neglected" part of the criminal justice sys-
tem and defined six urgent needs in relation to it.
The Chief Justice first called attention to the in-
adequate physical plant of our prisons itself, point-
ing out that rising crime has created severe over-
crowding and that prisons "are poorly located and
inaccessible to the families of the inmates, too far
away from facilities for work release programs, and
located in areas that do not provide adequate hous-
ing for personnel of the institutions." The Chief
Justice then emphasized the need to recruit prison
staffs of the highest caliber and training and the
need to classify and separate clearly different types
of offenders and prevent prisons from criminaliz-
ing their occupants. Chief Justice Burger also
pointed out the failure of our prisons to provide
their youthful occupants with exercise programs to
"bum off the surplus energies of youth" and with
work and educational programs which will moti-
vate inmates to improve themselves. Society has
"a moral obligation to try to change an offender-
to make him a reasonably successful human being."
Finally, the Chief Justice stressed the need that
every individual has to communicate with others.
Every inmate should be given an opportunity to
communicate with those who run the institutions
and should be given a chance to regulate part of
his life.
Edwards, Foreword-Penitentiarks Produce No Peni-
tents, 63 J. CRm L.C. & P.S. 154, 159-60 (1972),
quoting from an address by Chief Justice Burger, 1971
National Conference on Corrections, summarized in 10
BNA CaRm. L. REP. 2238 (Dec. 29, 1971).
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Second, this Committee's deliberations about
capital punishment necessarily lead to discussion
of alternative sanctions, in the event that capital
punishment is deemed to be either inappropriate or
constitutionally impermissible. For example, con-
cern has repeatedly been raised at Committee meet-
ings, as to whether any other sanction can provide
a comparable deterrent effect, tending to prevent
the robber from killing his victim and to prevent
the prisoner from killing his guard or fellow-inmate.
If a suitable non-capital sanction could be found,
the relative utility of capital punishment would be
reduced.
Third, this Committee's deliberations about
capital punishment necessarily lead to discussion
of the corrections system. Special concern has been
expressed at Committee meetings, about the need
for a reliable system of classifying inmates, so that
society is protected against the release of that rela-
tively small percentage of inmates who remain
dangerous despite the best efforts of rehabilitation
programs. If dangerous inmates could be reliably
classified and kept in custody, again the relative
utility of capital punishment would be reduced.
And, of course, the entire system of rehabilitation
programs has caused serious concern.
This Committee has not been charged with re-
sponsibility for a comprehensive review of the
entire system of criminal justice and corrections,
nor could such an undertaking have been accom-
plished within the time allotted.
However, the need for such a pr6ject becomes
apparent from this Committee's deliberations
about its assigned topic. The question whether to
reinstate capital punishment cannot adequately be
answered without serious consideration of the
alternatives.
As a counterpart to the work of this Committee,
a comprehensive study would be highly appro-
priate, covering our entire system of criminal
justice and corrections.
Substantial research projects have been con-
ducted, in Florida and elsewhere, on various as-
pects of criminal justice and corrections, but we are
not aware of any readily available source of the
comprehensive information we deem an essential
basis for legislative proposals. However, the avail-
ability of various research materials will reduce the
amount of time which would otherwise be needed
to complete the project we suggest. We estimate
that our suggested project could be completed
within between six and twelve months, if funded
so as to employ at least one full-time project di-
rector, together with consultants and supporting
secretarial and research personnel. Completion of
the project within that period would enable legisla-
tive proposals, including budgetary recommenda-
tions, to be submitted to the Florida Legislature
no later than its regular 1974 session.
RECOMM ATION-NO ATTEMPT TO REINSTATE
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT PENDING COMPLETION OF
COMPREHENSIVE STUDY
We were asked to advise the Committee regard-
ing the constitutional effects of Furman v. Georgia.
Having commented on the assigned topic, we feel
obliged to follow through by submitting a recom-
mendation to the Committee, based upon our over-
all evaluations of the various matters discussed.
We recoimmend that a comprehensive study of our
entire system of criminal justice and corrections be
cmnmissioned and undertaken, as discussed in the
preceding section, and that, pending completion of
the comprehensive study, no attempt be made to rein-
state capital punishment in Florida.
This recommendation is based upon our view
that: (1) no constitutional basis can justify any
attempt to reinstate capital punishment without an
accompanying fundamental change in our system
of criminal justice, which can be attempted only
after the comprehensive study; (2) no satisfactory
policy choice regarding capital punishment can be
made without adequate study of alternative types
of sanction, which again can be adequately con-
sidered only after the comprehensive study; and
(3) our entire system of criminal justice and correc-
tions needs reform, whether or not capital punish-
ment is reinstated.
Immediate enactment of a statute imposing capi-
tal punishment would offer few benefits to society.
The existence of the statute might serve as a deter-
rent to would-be perpetrators of capital offenses, if
they were aware of the statute, if they believed it
would survive constitutional challenge, and if they
were deterred by the possibility of being them-
selves subjected to its penalty. However, most
people who would be aware of a new statute would
also be aware that the United States Supreme
Court decided in 1972 that capital punishment was
unconstitutional and released over 600 inmates
from death row. Nothing short of another decision
by that Court is likely to convince the general
public that capital punishment has been effectively
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reinstated. Unless and until such a decision is
rendered, the deterrent effect of any capital punish-
ment statute is likely to be minimal.
We have expressed serious doubts whether any
capital punishment statute could possibly with-
stand constitutional challenge, even if drafted after
the most careful study and consideration. The risk
of unconstitutionality would be greatly increased
if the statute were drafted hastily, without benefit
of the comprehensive study. The high risk of having
the statute declared unconstitutional would pro-
duce a corresponding risk of demoralization of law
enforcement officers, together with general confu-
sion in the administration of criminal justice.
Furthermore, if a statute reinstating capital
punishment were enacted hastily, without benefit
of the comprehensive study, the statute might re-
flect premature decisions on momentous policy
choices, and our progress toward sound reform
might be delayed.
II. FLORIDA'S LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO FURMAN: AN EXERCISE
IN FUTILITY?.*
CHARLES W. EHRHARDT** AiN L. HAROLD LEVINSONt
Furman v. Georgia,' decided by a five to four
vote of the United States Supreme Court in June
1972, held that the imposition and carrying out
of the death penalty under the statutes of Georgia
and Texas constituted cruel and unusual punish-
ment, in violation of the eighth and fourteenth
Amendments. Less than six months later, Florida
became the first state to enact a post-Furman
capital punishment statute.2
* The authors served as members of the five-man
legal staff of the Governor's Committee to Study
Capital Punishment, and participated in the proceed-
ings of the committee from August until November,
1972, as well as in preparation of the memorandum sub-
mitted by the legal advisory staff, an edited version of
which appears as a companion piece to this article.
The views expressed in this article are those of the
authors and should not be attributed to the committee
or to the institutions with which the authors are asso-
ciated.
Preparation of this article was greatly facilitated by
the cooperation of Robert Mounts, Assistant General
Counsel, Office of the Governor, and Martha Bass,
Director of Senate Legislative Services. The authors
gratefully acknowledge their assistance.
The title of this article is adapted from a statement
by retired Florida supreme court Chief Justice E.
Harris Drew, Chairman of the Governor's Committee
to Study Capital Punishment, reported in the Miami
(Fla.) Herald, Dec. 3, 1972, at 1-B, that Florida's post-
Furman capital punishment statute was "an exercise in
futility."
** B.S., 1962, Iowa State University; J.D., 1964,
University of Iowa. Associate Professor of Law, Florida
State University.
t B.B.A., 1957, LL.B., 1962, University of Miami;
LL.M., 1964, New York University. Professor of Law,
University of Florida.
1408 U.S. 238 (1972).
2 Ch. 72-724, [19721 Fla. Sess. Laws__ (Spec. Sess.
1972), enacted by the Florida Legislature on December
1, signed by the Governor on December 8, 1972, there-
upon becoming law.
This article traces the background of the new
Florida statute, including summaries of pre-exist-
ing Florida law on capital punishment, judicial
responses to Furman, and the legislative history
of the new statute. The article concludes with a
commentary on various aspects of the new statute.
FLORIDA LAW AT T=iM or FuRmAN v. GEORGIA
At the time Furman was decided, Florida
statutes' provided that a defendant found guilty
of a capital felony must be sentenced to death
unless the verdict included a recommendation of
mercy by the jury, in which event the sentence
must be life imprisonment.
A statutory amendment was enacted in March
1972, 4 to become effective on October 1, 1972,
providing, for the first time in Florida law, a bifur-
cated trial. The statute provided that a defendant
convicted of a capital felony was to receive a
separate sentencing "trial" on the question
whether the penalty would be death or life im-
prisonment. The resulting jury decision was bind-
ing on the court. The statute contained lists of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, but
only as guidelines for the matters to be considered
during the sentencing proceeding. This bifurcated
trial provision was never used, since the Furman
decision intervened between the enactment and the
effective date of the statute, and the Florida
Supreme Court interpreted Furman as eliminating
all capital felonies in Florida.5
Another statutory amendment, also enacted in
3 FLA. STATS. §§ 775.082(1), 921.141 (1971).
4 Ch. 72-72, [1972] Fla. Sess. Laws 122, amending
FLA. STATS. § 921.141 (1971).
- See note 21 infra and accompanying text.
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March 1972,6 to become effective on October 1,
1972, provided that if the death penalty were
held unconstitutional, persons previously sentenced
to death must be re-sentenced to life imprison-
ment, by the trial court, with no eligibility for
parole. This re-sentencing provision was rendered
ineffective when the Florida supreme court re-
sentenced all death row inmates prior to October
1, 1972.
7
Under pre-Furman Florida law, an appeal could
be taken to the Florida supreme court, as a matter
of right, in all cases where the death penalty was
imposed.' The supreme court could review the
conviction of guilt, but not the severity of the
sentence. 9 If the trial court did not impose the
death sentence, appeal was taken to the district
court of appeals, the intermediate appellate court
which has general appellate jurisdiction in all
matters except those in which the Florida Con-
stitution confers jurisdiction elsewhere.10
Pre-Furman Florida law classified felonies as
being either capital, or first, second or third de-
gree." The capital felonies were: premeditated
murder,2 certain felony-murders,"3 bombing or
machine-gunning in public places,14 homicide
6 Ch. 72-118, [1972] Fla. Sess. Laws 258, amending
FLA. STATS. § 775.082 (1971).
7See. notes 25 & 26 infra and accompanying text.
8 
FLA. CONST. art. V, §4(2) (1968), renumbered art. V,
§ 3(b)(1) (March 1972). See note 10 infra regarding
the additional provision in the 1972 amendment of the
constitution, authorizing the legislature to expand the
supreme court's jurisdiction to include appeals from
sentences of life imprisonment.
9 FLA. STATS. § 924.06 (1971) provides that a de-
fendant may appeal from "a sentence, on the ground
that it is illeg al. The only provision for discretionary
reduction of sentences by an appellate court is in FLA.
STATS. § 924.41(3) (1971) authorizing the circuit court
to lower sentences imposed by the municipal court.
(The circuit court is the court of general trial jurisdic-
tion, which sits also as an appellate court to review
judgments of municipal courts. The municipal courtswill be pbased out of existence by 1977, pursuant to
§ 20(d)(4) of Article V, the Judiciary Article of the
Florida Constitution, as amended in March 1972.)
10 FLA. CoNsr. art. V, § 5(3) (1968), renumbered art.
V, § 4(b) (March 1972) but substantially unchanged.
The 1972 amendment of Article V contained a new
provision, § 3(b)(2), authorizing the legislature to
expand the supreme court's jurisdiction to include
appeals from sentences of life imprisonment. If this
provision were implemented by legislation, the district
courts of appeal would automatically lose this jurisdic-
tion.
"FLA. STATS. § 775.081(1) (1971).
"FL. STATS. § 782.04(1) (1971).
1 1d. The felony murders were those "committed
in the perpetration of or in the attempt to perpetrate
any arson, rape, robbery, burglary, abominable and
detestable crime against nature or kidnapping."
1 FLA. SiATS. § 790.16(1) (1971).
caused by a destructive device," rape of a female
of the age of ten years or more, 8 "carnal knowl-
edge and abuse" of a female child under the age
of ten years, 7 and kidnapping for ransom."
At the time of the Furman decision, a stay order
was in effect, issued in 1967 by a federal court in
Florida,"9 preventing the execution of any death
sentence in Florida pending the outcome of the
Supreme Court litigation testing the constitution-
ality of capital punishment. In addition, Governor
Reubin Askew issued an Executive Order in
February 1972,21 staying the execution of any
death sentence in Florida until July 1, 1973, so as
to provide time for the outcome of pending litiga-
tion, and for legislative consideration of the entire
question of capital punishment. The Executive
Order recited that the Governor had unsuccessfully
requested the 1972 Florida Legislature to declare
a legislative moratorium on further executions,
and to authorize appointment of a commission to
examine the whole area of capital punishment,
capital offenses and capital offenders in Florida.
JUDiIcAL RESPONSES TO FumrAw
In Donaldson v. Sack,2' decided on July 17, 1972,
the Florida supreme court held that Furman
eliminated capital punishment-and capital felo-
nies-from Florida law, until new legislation
might revive them. The court further held that
persons thereafter convicted of offenses desig-
nated on the statute books as "capital" should be
punished by life imprisonment, and that various
incidents of capital felonies, such as the twelve-
man trial jury," were no longer required.
Two weeks later, in Newman v. Wainwright,"
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit emphasized that Furman invalidated the
capital punishment statutes of Florida. The court
noted that in Florida, as in Georgia and Texas,
whose statutes were before the Supreme Court in
5 FLA. STATS. § 790.161(1) (1971).
16 FLA. STATS. § 794.01 (1971).
17 d.
Is FLA. STATS. § 805.02 (1971).
19 Adderly v. Wainwright, 272 F. Supp. 530 (MLD.
Fla. 1967), 46 F.R.D. 97 (M.D. Fla. 1968), dismissed
as mool - F. Supp. - (M.D. Fla. 1972).
20 Exec. Order [Fla.] No. 72-8 (February 21, 1972).
21265 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 1972).
1" FLA. CoNsT. art. 1, § 22 provides that "the qualifica-
tions and the number of jurors, not fewer than six,
shall be fixed by law." FLA. STATS. § 913.10 (1971)
provides for a twelve-member jury in capital cases,
and a six-member jury in all other criminal cases.
23 464 F.2d 615 (5th Cir. 1972).
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Furman, "the death penalty has been inequitably,
arbitrarily and infrequently imposed." 
24
In Anderson v. State25 and In re Baker,"8 de-
cided on September 8 and 26, 1972, respectively,
the Florida supreme court resentenced former
death row inmates. The court thus avoided the
impact of the pre-Furman enactment, effective
October 1, 1972, which provided for life imprison-
ment without eligibility for parole in the event
the death penalty were held unconstitutional.Y
Anderson involved 40 persons whose appeals
were still pending in the Florida supreme court.
The court held that it retained jurisdiction, and
could therefore itself carry out the resentencing,
without going through the "ministerial formality"
of remanding to the trial court. Baker involved 60
persons who did not have appeals pending. The
court decided to treat this class on the same basis
as the Anderson class, as a matter of equal pro-
tection. All the Anderson and Baker inmates were
resentenced to life imprisonment and, since parole
was not precluded, the possibility of parole re-
mained open. Those inmates who were under
sentence of death for rape committed before 1972
were given leave to file a motion with the trial
court for mitigation of sentence from life to a
term of years, in accordance with pre-1972 law.
THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE To FURMAN
Committee Action2
A few days after the Supreme Court handed
down its decision in Furman, some members of
2, Id. at 616.
26 267 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 1972).
26 267 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1972).
27 See note 6 and accompanying text supra.
29In addition to the committee action described in
this section, the Attorney General of Florida also
suggested legislation requiring imposition of a manda-
tory, death sentence for persons convicted of certain
classes of premeditated murder. Fla. S. 1-A, Spec.
Sess. § 3 (1972); Fla. H.R. 8-A, Spec. Sess. §3, (1972).
See FINAL REPORT OF THE [FLA.] HOUSE SELECT COm-
MITTEE ON THE DEATH PENALTY 4-5 (1972). The At-
torney General's proposals, in memorandum form, were
widely publicized. See, e.g., St. Petersburg (Fla.)
Times, Nov. 26, 1972, at 4-D. Legislative proposals
reflecting the Attorney General's views are discussed
in note 53 infra.
The president of The Florida Bar appointed a five-
man committee, which submitted a memorandum to
the Governor's Committee to Study Capital Punish-
ment, note 32 and accompanying text infra, one week
before the special legislative session convened. The
Bar committee, speaking for itself and not necessarily
for the president or members of the Bar, argued that
the statute enacted in March 1972, ch. 72-72, [1972]
Fla. Sess. Laws 122, amending FLA. STATS. § 921.141
(1971), providing for a bifurcated trial and enumerating
the Florida legislature requested the Governor to
convene a special legislative session for the pur-
pose of considering the reinstatement of capital
punishment. The Governor declined to call a
special session at that time, but promised to call
one promptly after the general election in Novem-
ber 1972.29 Meanwhile, the Speaker of the Florida
House of Representatives established the House
Select Committee on the Death Penalty.0 The
committee held hearings and received testimony
from representatives of various interested groups
and from the public at large. After deciding that
the death penalty should be reinstated, the com-
mittee drafted tentative legislation3 ' calling for
mandatory death sentences upon conviction of
premeditated murder and a small number of other
crimes. The Select Committee's legislation per-
mitted the jury to convict of lesser included
offenses.
On July 28, 1972, Governor Askew issued an Ex-
ecutive Order2 creating the Governor's Committee
to Study Capital Punishment. The order required
the committee to undertake a detailed study and
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, was com-
patible with Furman. The committee recommended
that "Florida ... proceed under the present law and
secure a new ruling from the U.S. Supreme Court."
REPORT OF THE DEATH PENALTY COMMITTEE Or THE
FLORIDA BAR (1972).
The President of the Senate appointed a Senate
Council on Criminal Justice which proposed a bill that
was never filed or introduced. The Senate Council's
bill would have deleted the existing statutory language
relating to jury recommendation of mercy, thus making
the death penalty mandatory upon conviction of one of
the enumerated capital crimes. Interview with Martha
Bass, Director of Senate Legislative Services, in Talla-
hassee, Florida, Dec. 8, 1972.
29 Governor Askew discussed the matter, in retro-
spect, in a news conference on November 20, 1972.
Had I not indicated last summer a special session
in the fall, the chances would have been better
than even that the Legislature, in the middle of a
campaign, might have called themselves back into
session.... This is better.
St. Petersburg (Fla.) Times, Nov. 21, 1972, at 1-B.
30 See FINAL REPORT OF THE [FLA.] HOUSE SELECT
COMITTEE ON THE DEATH PENALTY 1 (1972).
11 The Select Committee's proposal is embodied in
the original version of Fla. H.R. I-A, Spec. Sess. (1972)
(submitted by Representative Gautier and others).
See notes 39-50 and accompanying text infra for a
discussion of this bill and the degree to which the
Governor's bill modified it.
2 Exec. Order [Fla.] No. 72-37 (July 28, 1972). The
blue-ribbon committee's seventeen members included a
retired Chief Justice of the Florida supreme court, two
ex-Governors, a past president of The Florida Bar,
members of the Florida House and Senate, and repre-
sentatives from many segments of the criminal justice
system, as well as a number of informed citizens. The
Governor also appointed both an advisory committee
and a legal advisory staff.
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make recommendations to the Governor as to
whether the death penalty should be retained,
what alternative forms of punishment were avail-
able if the death penalty were not reinstated for
some or all of the existing capital crimes, and
what changes were required in the proceduries re-
lating to the execution of the death penalty,
executive clemency, treatment of death row in-
mates, and other related procedural matters.
After its organizational meeting on August 17,
1972, the committee held a series of public meet-
ings throughout the state to collect information
relative to the question of whether capital punish-
ment should be reinstated and, if so, in what form.
Expert witnesses from across the nation and mem-
bers of the public so desiring testified at each
meeting. A secondary purpose of the hearings was
to serve as a mechanism for public education on
the issues surrounding the question of capital
punishment.
After three months of deliberations and contrary
to the recommendations of the committee's legal
advisory staff,5' the committee recommended to
the Governor legislation which provided for a
bifurcated trial in capital cases. Sentencing was to
be by a panel of three judges after they heard
evidence at a separate sentencing hearing, and
after they had considered the presence of certain
enumerated mitigating and aggravating circum-
stances." Additionally, the committee passed a
resolution calling for the creation of a-special
citizen's commission to study and make recom-
mendations concerning the improvement of the
entire system of crmminal justice in Florida."
Legislative Skirmishes
The Florida legislature convened in special
session on November 28, 1972, to consider whether
capital punishment should be legislatively rein-
stated."6 Governor Askew adopted the recom-
mendations of the Governor's Committee to Study
Capital Punishment" and, in his opening address
5
3See Ehrhardt, et al., The Future of Capital .Punish-
ment in Florida: Analysis and Recommendations, 64 J.
Camr. L. & C. 2, 9-10 (1973).
FNAL REPORT OF THE [Fla.] GovEasoR's Cox-
In1TTFE TO STuDY CAPrrAL P rsmmrNT 147-62 (1972).
See notes 42-49 and accompanying text infra for a
discussion of the proposed legislation.
35 Id. at 163-64. A similar study was recommended
by the committee's legal advisory staff. Ehrhardt,
supra note 33, at 8-9.
41 FLA. H.R. Jouy., Spec. Sess. 1 (1972).
7 The Governor stated, however, that he continued
to have "mixed feelings as to the necessity, the rightness
to a joint session of the legislature, proposed the
bifurcated trial for capital cases. His proposal
required that all sentencing findingstbe in accord-
ance with strict statutory guidelines and based
upon the record of a separate sentencing proceed-
ing. He strongly urged the legislators to reject any
proposal which provided for mandatory imposition
of the death penalty without opportunity for
mercy. Because he felt that a jury would merely
exercise its discretion at an earlier stage by con-
victing on a lesser charge, he reasoned that the
same discretion which Furman deemed imper-
missible would be present under any mandatory
system. Moreover, he pointed out that Chief
Justice Burger, with three other dissenters in
Furman, condemned the mandatory imposition of
the death penalty as archaic.-'
Following the Governor's address to the joint
session, the House Select Committee on the
Death Penalty recommended to the House of
Representatives the passage of a series of four
bills"9 which directly contradicted the Governor's
bill by providing for mandatory death sentences
for certain crimes. Under the proposal there was
to be no determination by the trial jury other than
the guilt of the defendant. Once a guilty verdict
was returned, a sentence of death was mandated
regardless of any mitigating circumstances or
feelings of leniency by the judge or jury.40 The
Select Committee's bill did, however, narrow the
list of capital crimes by reclassifying certain
felonies,, previously capital, as felonies of the
first degree, for which the maximum punishment
was life imprisonment.4
and even the legality of capital punishment in any
form." Id. at 6.
Representative Johnson, a member of the Governor's
Committee, subsequently introduced the bill recom-
mended by the Governor's Committee as an amend-
ment to a bill proposed by the House Select Com-
mittee. Fla. H.R. 14-A, Spec. Sess. (1972). A modified
version of this bill was subsequently passed by the
House. See notes 50-52 and accompanying text infra.
3 FLA. H.R. JouR., Spec. Sess. 6 (1972).
39 Fla. H.R. 1-A, H.R. 2-A, H.R. 3-A, H.R. 4-A,
Spec. Sess. (1972) (Select Committee bill).
40 Fla. H.R., 1-A, Spec. Sess. § 1 (1972) (Select Com-
mittee bill).
41The crimes of throwing bombs when death of a
person results, id. § 2, kidnapping for ransom, id. § 7,
and felony-murders not listed below were reduced
from capital felonies to felonies of the first degree.
Capital crimes under the bill were premeditated murder,
id. § 2; murder committed by any person engaged in
the perpetration of any arson, rape, robbery, burglary,
or kidnapping, id.; carnal knowledge of a person under
the age of thirteen, id. § 6; the intentional interference
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On the floor of the House, the bill recommended
by the Governor's Committee was offered as an
amendment fo the Select Committee's bill.42 The
proposed amendment entirely changed the philoso-
phy of the bill then under consideration. Rather
than being crime-oriented, as was the Select
Committee's bill, the Governor's bill was sen-
tencing-oriented, expressing the general policy of
taking a life only when a life is taken." The Gover-
nor's bill created a new cla.sification of crime,
the life felony," redefined capital felonies, and
provided a procedure under which the decision
would be made as to whether death or life im-
prisonment would be imposed in capital cases.
Apart from certain novel provisions concerning
felony-murder, 4' the focal point of the Governor's
bill was the provision for a bifurcated trial in
capital cases. Following a conviction for a capital
crime, the bill provided for a separate sentencing
proceeding to be conducted by the original trial
judge and two other judges from outside the
judicial circuit in which the trial was held, to be
selected by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
of Florida. Upon findings of fact46 by a majority of
with or injury to property of the United States used
for defense or war, id. § 3; and the throwing of bombs
or discharging of machine guns when death results,
id. § 5.
42FLA. H.R. JouR., Spec. Sess. 17-20 (1972); Fla.
H.R. 14-A, Spec. Sess. (1972).
43Fla. H.R. 14-A, Spec. Sess. § 9 (1972) (drafters'
comment). FLA. STATS. § 779.07 (1971), listing treason
as a capital offense, was not amended by the Governor's
bill. The Select Committee's bill listed certain forms of
rape as capital felonies, see Fla. H.R. 1-A, Spec. Sess.
§ 6 (1972), as well as treason, see id., § 3.
44 The life felony classification is retained in § 3,
ch. 72-724, [1972] Fla. Sess. Laws - (Spec. Sess. 1972).
The drafters' comment expresses the reason for the
new classification:
Provides a new category of felony to serve as an
additional deterrent to those crimes [which], while
not classified capital, are especially serious in
nature.
Id. The minimum statutory punishment for an offender
convicted of a life felony is thirty years, although
parole before that time is not precluded. Id. § 4.
45 The bill provided that "the unlawful killing of a
human being, when perpetrated from a premeditated
design to effect the death of the person killed or any
human being shall... constitute a capital felony. ...."
Fla. H.R. 14-A, Spec. Sess. § 1 (1972). However, the
principle of felony-murder was retained only as a
rebuttable presumption of premeditation when a killing
occurred during the furtherance of certain serious
felonies. Id. The Select Committee's bill was much
broader in scope. It defined as a capital felony a felony-
murder if a person was killed by one "engaged" in the
perpetration of certain named felonies. See Fla. H.R.
1-A, Spec. Sess. § 1 (1972) (Select Committee bill).
16 The bill authorized the court to receive any evi-
the three-judge court that one of several enum-
erated aggravating circumstances was present, the
death penalty was mandatory. 4 However, if the
court found none of these aggravating circum-
stances to be present, or if the court found a sub-
stantial mitigating circumstance to be present,4s
a sentence of life imprisonment was mandated.
49
This novel sentencing procedure represented an at-
tempt to reduce discretion in the sentencing proc-
ess, yet retain an element of mercy.
A divided House approved the Governor's bill
70-47 as an amendment to the bill recommended
by the Select Committee, ° thereby defeating the
Select Committee's bill. Thereafter, the Governor's
bill was altered in several minor respects 5' by
amendments from the floor. The bill, as amended,
passed the House unanimously.
5 2
The Florida Senate, by a vote of 36 to 1,53
dence it deemed probative and which related to one
or more of the enumerated aggravating or mitigating
circumstances, without regard to the traditional exclu-
sionary evidentiary rules, as long as the convicted
offender was permitted a fair opportunity to rebut
any hearsay statements. Fla. H.R. 14-A, Spec. Sess.
§ 5 (1972). The bill did not purport to allow evidence
excludable on constitutional grounds. Id. (drafters'
comment).
47 Fla. H.R. 14-A, Spec. Sess. § 5 (1972).
48 The bill did not provide for a one-on-one correla-
tion between aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
If the court found "that an aggravating circumstance
exists as enumerated" and "that no substantial mitigat-
mg circumstance exists as enumerated ... which would
warrant leniency" the death penalty was mandatory.
Id. Too, in contrast with ch. 72-72, [1972] Fla. Sess.
Laws 122, amending FLA. STATS. § 921.141 (1971), the
list of aggravating and mitigating circumstances
enumerated were not merely guidelines for the court.
The court was restricted to the enumerated circum-
stances in its decision. See Fla. H.R. 14-A, Spec. Sess.
§ 5 (1972); cf. § 9, ch. 72-724, [1972] Fla. Sess. Laws
(Spec. Sess. 1972).
49 Fla. H.R. 14-A, Spec. Sess. § 5 (1972).
10 FLA. H.R. JouR., Spec. Sess. 20 (1972).
11 First, carnal knowledge of a person under ten
years old by a person seventeen years or older was made
a capital felony. Forcible rape of a person ten years or
older was classified as a life felony. Id. at 22. Addi-
tionally, if any person was killed as a result of air
piracy within the boundaries of Florida, the offense
was deemed capital. Id. at 23. The felony-murder sec-
tion of the Governor's bill was amended to include
any killing which resulted "from the unlawful distribu-
tion of heroin or cocaine by a person over the age of
seventeen years when such drug is proven to be the
proximate cause of the death of the user." Id.
12 1d. at 23.
13 FLA. S. JouR., Spec. Sess. 26 (1972). The Attorney
General's bill, see note 28 supra, was never actively
considered by either the House or Senate although it
had been pre-filed in each chamber. The bill provided
for the mandatory imposition of the death penalty
upon conviction of capital crimes. Although the bill
reduced felony-murder from murder in the first degree
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adopted the philosophy of the Governor's bill, as
amended by the House, but substantially altered
the bill's sentencing procedure." While the Senate
version retained the sentencing options of the
House-amended Governor's bill-death or life
imprisonment-the Senate replaced the bill's
three-judge sentencing court with the judge and
jury which presided at the convicted offender's
trial.5"
Under the Senate bill the jury was to retire after
hearing evidence on the existence of aggravating
and mitigating circumstances whether or not
enumerated in the bill5" and by majority vote
render an advisory opinion to the trial judge (1)
on the presence or absence of those factors and
(2) whether the death sentence should be imposed.
A jury finding that no aggravating circumstances
existed or that they were outweighed by mitigat-
ing circumstances was conclusive. Thus, if the
jury did not recommend the death penalty, the
to a life felony, the bill made any unlawful and knowing
killing a capital felony when committed under -the
following circumstances:
1) When committed in the perpetration of certain
named felonies; or
2) When committed pursuant to a contract for
hire; or
3) When the victim was an elected officer and
"assassinated"; or
4) When the victim was a law enforcement officer; or
5) When the perpetrator was a probationer or
parolee who had previously been convicted of a
life felony or murder in the first or second degree.
The offenses of treason, throwing bombs, discharging
destructive devices resulting in death, rape, and kid-
napping for ransom were all reclassified as life felonies,
with a ten year minimum before parole could be
granted.
"The most significant other amendment provided
that carnal knowledge of a female ten years old or
younger by a person seventeen years old or older, with
force, was a capital felony. Rape of a female over the
age of ten and carnal knowledge of a female under the
age of eleven years were reclassified as life felonies.
FLA. S. Jou., Spec. Sess. 23 (1972). The Senate also
amended the bill so that if a killing occurred during an
"aircraft piracy" a rebuttable presumption of pre-
meditated design arose, making conviction of the
crime a capital felony. See id. at 25.
65 FLA. S. Jou., Spec. Sess. 23-24 (1972). The final
version of the Senate bill provided that if the defendant
had waived trial by jury or had pleaded guilty, the
sentencing proceeding was to be conducted before a
jury empaneled for that purpose. See id. at 24.51 While the Governor's bill limited the aggravating
and mitigating circumstances to those listed in the
bill-and limited the scope of evidence at the sentencing
hearing to those circumstances-the Senate amend-
ments made it clear that the court, in its discretion,
could consider any other factors deemed relevant. See
FIA. S. JouR., Spec. Sess. 25 (1972). The final statute,
however, adopted the limitations of the Governor's
bill. See notes 65-68 infra and accompanying text.
trial judge was required to impose a life sentence.
But if the jury's recommendation was for the death
penalty, the trial judge was required to reconsider
the evidence and make specific written findings of
fact as to whether any aggravating circumstances
existed and if so whether they were outweighed by
any mitigating circumstances. A sentence of
death was mandatory unless the court found that
insufficient aggravating circumstances existed or,
if found to be present, were outweighed by miti-
gating circumstances; s7 in such a case the court
was required to sentence the offender to life in
prison, with restricted parole opportunitiesO
THE NEW FLORIDA CAPITAL PUNIsMIrEN STATUTE
Because neither the House nor the Senate would
retreat from its stance on the procedure and com-
position of the sentencing proceeding contained in
the bill passed by each, a conference committee5 9
was necessary to resolve the differences. The
statute finally approved 6w is a hybrid: in return
for the House's approval of a judge and jury
sentencing procedure, the Senate abandoned its
insistence that the jury have a determinative role
in sentencing in capital cases. While the statute
retains the Senate's philosophy that the jury should
participate in the sentencing process, the jury now
has the authority only to give an advisory sen-
tence which can then be rejected by the trial
judge if his findings regarding mitigating and ag-
gravating circumstances justify such action.
6'
Under the new statute, a separate sentencing
proceeding for convicted capital offenders is to be
conducted "as soon as practicable" by the trial
judge before the trial jury. If trial by jury was
waived by the defendant or if the defendant
pleaded guilty, the sentencing proceeding is to be
conducted before a jury empaneled for that pur-
pose, unless also waived by the defendant.62 Any
evidence which has probative value and is relevant
to a determination of the sentence to be imposed
7 See note 56 supra.
58FLA. S. JouR., Spec. Sess. 22 (1972).
59FLA. H.R. JouL., Spec. Sess. 42 (1972). For an
interesting account of the conference committee's
actions see Dyckman, Our Legislature in Action: The
Unwisdom of it All, St. Petersburg (Fla.) Times, Dec.
3, 1972, at 12-B.60 The approved bill was signed by the Governor,
without public ceremony, on December 8, 1972. St.
Petersburg (Fla.) Times, Dec. 9, 1972, at 12-B.
61 Ch. 72-724, § 9 [1972] Fla. Sess. Laws - (Spec.
Sess. 1972) (amending FLA. STATS. § 921.141 (1971))
[hereinafter cited as Florida Capital Punishment Act].
62Id.
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may be received" regardless of its admissibility
under the exclusionary rules of evidence, provided
only that the defendant is accorded a fair oppor-
tunity to rebut any hearsay statements. The intro-
duction of any evidence secured in violation of the
defendant's constitutional rights is specifically
barred. Both the prosecutor and the defendant or
his counsel are permitted to present argument
for or against the sentence of death."
After hearing the evidence, the jury, by ma-
jority vote, is to render an advisory sentence of
either life imprisonment or death to the trial
judge.8 5 If the jury finds that sufficient aggravat-
ing circumstances 66 exist to recommend the death
"Id. The Governor's bill limited evidence to those
matters relating to any of the bill's enumerated aggra-
vating or mitigating circumstances. See Fla. H.R. 14-A,
Spec. Sess. § 5 (1972). The Senate bill and the final
statute are virtually identical with regard to the type
of evidence admissible; both provide for any relevant
and probative evidence as long as the evidence includes
matters relating to the enumerated aggravating or
mitigating circumstances. Compare FLA. S. JOuR.,
Spec. Sess. 23 (1972) with Florida Capital Punishment
Act §9.
6Florida Capital Punishment Act § 9.
65Id. at § 9(2):
(2) After hearing all the evidence, the jury shall
deliberate and render an advisory sentence to the
court based upon the following matters:
(a) Whether sufficient aggravating circum-
stances exist as enumerated in subsection (6),
and
(b) Whether sufficient mitigating circum-
stances exist as enumerated in subsection (7),
which outweigh aggravating circumstances
found to exist, and
(c) Based on these considerations whether the
defendant should be sentenced to life or death.
Subsection (3) makes clear that the jury's recommenda-
tion is to be by majority vote. See note 68 infra.
66Id. at § 9(6):
(6) Aggravating circumstances.-Aggravating cir-
cumstances shall be limited to the following:
(a) The capital felony was committed by a
person under sentence of imprisonment;
(b) The defendant was previously convicted of
another capital felony involving the use or threat
of violence to the person;
(c) The defendant knowingly created a great
risk of death to many persons;
(d) The capital felony was committed while
the defendant was engaged or was an accomplice
in the commission of, or an attempt to commit,
or flight after committing or attempting to
commit any robbery, rape, arson, burglary,
kidnapping, aircraft piracy, or the unlawful
throwing, placing or discharging of a destructive
device or bomb;
(e) The capital felony was committed for the
purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest
or effecting an escape from custody;
(f) The capital felony was committed for pecu-
niary gain;
(g) The capital felony was committed to disrupt
or hinder the lawful exercise of any govern-
sentence, then it must determine whether sufficient
mitigating circumstancesP exist to outweigh the
aggravating circumstances justifying a recommen-
dation of life imprisonment.
After receiving the advisory sentence from the
jury, the trial court is required to make its own
determination as to the presence or absence of
aggravating or mitigating circumstances.' If the
court determines that sufficient aggravating cir-
cumstances exist to impose the death penalty
and that either no mitigating circumstances exist
or those that do exist are insufficient to outweigh
the aggravating circumstances, the court must
specifically so find in writing and impose the death
penalty. Both the judgment of conviction and
sentence of death are then subject to automatic
review by the Supreme Court of Florida." If,
on the other hand, the court determines that
mental function or the enforcement of laws;
(h) The capital felony was especially heinous,
atrocious or cruel.
7 Id. at § 9(7):
(7) Mitigating circumstances.-Mitigating Cir-
cumstances shall be the following:
(a) The defendant has no significant history of
prior criminal activity;
(b) The capital felony was committed while the
defendant was under the influence of extreme
mental or emotional disturbance;
(c) The victim was a participant in the de-
fendant's conduct or consented to the act;
(d) The defendant was an accomplice in the
capital felony committed by another person and
his participation was relatively minor;
(e) The defendant acted under extreme duress
or under the substantial domination of another
person;
(f) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate
the criminality of his conduct or to conform his
conduct to the requirements of law was sub-
stantially impaired;
(g) The age of the defendant at the time of the
crime.
68Id. at § 9(3):
(3) Notwithstanding the recommendation of a
majority of the jury, the court after weighing the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances shall
enter a sentence of life imprisonment or death, but
if the court imposes a sentence of death, it shall
set forth in writing its findings upon which the
sentence of death is based as to the facts:
(a) That sufficient aggravating circumstances
exist as enumerated in subsection (6), and
(b) That there are insufficient mitigating cir-
cumstances, as enumerated in subsection (7), to
outweigh the aggravating circumstances.
In each case in which the court imposes the death
sentence, the determination of the court shall be
supported by specific written findings of fact based
upon the circumstances in subsections (6) and (7)
and based upon the records of the trial and the
sentencing proceedings.
"Id. at § 9(5).
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mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravat-
ing circumstances or that no aggravating circum-
stances exist, the court must sentence the con-
victed offender to life imprisonment with re-
stricted parole opportunities.70
In addition to premeditated murder, capital
felonies include the unlawful killing of a person
by an individual engaged in the perpetration
of any arson, rape, robbery, burglary, kidnap-
ping, aircraft piracy, the unlawful throwing,
placing, or discharging of a destructive device or
bomb, or any killing of a human being resulting
from the unlawful distribution of heroin by a per-
son over the age of seventeen when such drug is
proved to be the proximate cause of the death of
the user. The new statute rejects the innovative
approach of the House-amended Governor's bill
with regard to felony-murderY'
The new statute retains the provision of the
Senate bill that rape or carnal knowledge of a
person under the age of eleven by a person over
the age of seventeen years is a capital felony, but
rejects the Senate bill's provision that force is
required; forcible rape of a person eleven years or
older is reduced to a life felonyY2 The crimes of
kidnapping,7' throwing bombs or discharging ma-
chine guns in public,74 and intentional inter-
ference with the United States or with any state
70 Id. § 1. The bill requires that a person who has
been convicted of a capital felony and who has received
a sentence of life imprisonment serve no less than
twenty-five calendar years before becoming eligible for
parole. Id. § 2 (amending FLA. STATS. § 775.082 (1971)
as amended by ch. 72-118, [1972] Fla. Sess. Laws 258).
If the death penalty provisions of the statute are held
to be unconstitutional, the statute provides that the
sentence for conviction of a capital felony will be life
imprisonment, subject to the same parole restriction
above. Id. (amending FLA. STATS. § 794.01 (1971)).71 See note 45 supra.
72 Florida Capital Punishment Act § 7 (amending
FLA. STATS. § 794.01 (1971)). However, FLA. STATS.
§ 794.01(2) (1971), as amended by the new capital
punishment statute, also provides that, "Whoever...
unlawfully and carnally knows and abuses a child under
the age of eleven years, shall be guilty of a life felony."
Subsection (1) of amended § 794.01 states flatly that a
person seventeen years or older who commits the same
crime as in subsection (2) is guilty of a capital felony.
While the legislative intent was probably to apply the
language of subsection (2) only to offenders under the
age of seventeen, the statute is not so limited on its
face.
73 Florida Capital Punishment Act § 8 (amending
FLA. STATS. § 805.02 (1971)).7 4 Id. § 5 (amending FLA. STATS. § 790.16 (1971)). The
statute also provides that a sentence not exceeding
life imprisonment is authorized where great bodily
harm to another or serious disruption: of governmental
operations results. Id.
in the preparation for war or for defense75 are all
reduced from capital felonies to life felonies.
THE NEW STATUTE-CRITIQUE AND ANALYSIS
Procedural Aspects of the New Bifurcated Trial-
Constitutional Problems
Florida law in effect when Furman was decided76
gave the jury complete life-or-death discretion,
expressed in the jury decision whether or not to
recommend mercy as part of the verdict, at the
end of a single-stage trial. The statutory amend-
ment, enacted in March 1972, to take effect on
October 1, 1972,77 provided a bifurcated trial,
conducted by the same judge and jury who adjudi-
cated guilt, culminating in a jury decision, bind-
ing on the court. The statute contained a list of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, but
only as guidelines.
The new law78 provides a bifurcated trial, by
the same judge and jury. The jury's function is
advisory only, and their recommendation does
not bind the judge. The statutory list of aggravat-
ing and mitigating circumstances must be con-
sidered in the sentencing proceeding and if the
judge imposes the death penalty he must support
his decision by findings concerning these circum-
stances.
The statutory lists of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances79 are intended to narrow the scope of
discretion in making the life-or-death decision.
However, the lists include some vague language,
which may not sufficiently accomplish the nar-
rowing purpose.
The italicized language in the following ex-
cerpt from the list of aggravating circumstances
seems especially vague: "the capital felony was
especially heinous, atrocious or cruel." Amongst the
mitigating circumstances: "the defendant has no
significant history of prior criminal activity";
"the defendant was an accomplice in the capital
felony committed by another person and his par-
ticipation was relatively minor"; "the defendant
acted under extreme duress or under the substantial
domination of another person"; "the capacity of
the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his
conduct or to conform his conduct to the require-
ments of law was substantially impaired"; "the
75 Id. § 4 (amending FLA. STATS. § 779.07 (1971)).
76 Note 3 supra.
7Note 4 supra.
78 Notes 59-75 and accompanying text supra.
71 Notes 66 & 67 supra.
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age of the defendant at the time of the crime."
Furthermore, the statute requires the jury to
render an advisory sentence, as to "whether
sufficient aggravating circumstances exist as enum-
erated... and whether sufficient mitigating cir-
cumstances exist as enumerated..., which out-
weigh aggravating circumstances found to exist.
.." 0 The judge must thereafter perform a simi-
lar weighing process."
The statute does not specify whether the exist-
ence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances
must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, or in
some other manner. Nor does the statute clarify
whether the trial judge, in performing his weighing
process, should give any weight to the recommen-
dation of the jury; even though the jury recom-
mendation has no binding force, it may still have
some degree of persuasion.
A considerable amount of discretion thus re-
mains in the sentencing process-first, the discre-
tion which inevitably exists in making a factual
determination, even under the most tightly drawn
statute; second, the additional discretion which is
created by the vague language by which the statute
describes the enumerated aggravating and miti-
gating circumstances; third, the further discretion
which is created by vagueness in the statute as
regards burden of proof and weight which the
judge should give to the jury recommendation.
A system of sentencing based upon enumerated
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, with
written findings by the court to support the death
sentence, may arguably be compatible with Fur-
man, provided the court is granted no more dis-
cretion than is necessary in order to carry out such
a system."' The new Florida statute, as indicated
above, grants the court unnecessarily broad dis-
cretion, which could be significantly reduced by
careful redrafting. The existence of this unneces-
sary amount of discretion raises serious questions
under Furman.
Williams v. New York,"3 decided by the United
States Supreme Court in 1949, sustained the
validity of a New York statute which authorized
the trial judge to impose the death sentence even
though the jury had recommended mercy. The
Court noted that the constitutional guarantee ot
80 Florida Capital Punishment Act § 9(5). See note
65 supra.
b, Id. § 9(3). See note 68 supra.
12 See, e.g., Ehrhardt, supra note 33.
337 U.S. 241 (1949).
trial by jury involved only the determination of
guilt, not the sentence.
While Williams indicates that the constitutional-
ity of a capital punishment statute is not impaired
by transferring ultimate sentencing authority from
the jury to the judge, a post-Furman decision by
the Delaware supreme court"' indicates that such
a transfer does nothing to enhance the validity of
the system when tested against Furman. The
Delaware court held that state's Williams-type
statute unconstitutional, since it "delegates to
jury and judge uncontrolled discretion in the
imposition of the death penalty that now stands
condemned by the United States Supreme Court
in Furman ... "I
If the United States Supreme Court takes a
similar view, Florida has made no progress toward
constitutionality by transferring ultimate life-or-
death authority from the jury to the judge. And,
by making this change, Florida has adopted a
policy which has been rejected by the vast ma-
jority of jurisdictions. A 1953 law review article"
noted that only New York,8' Delaware"s and
Utah" authorized the trial court to impose a
death sentence after the jury had recommended
mercy, while South Dakota" permitted the court
to grant mercy after a jury recommendation of
death but not vice versa. Since then, New York
has amended its statute so as to remove this
authority from the judge, who can now pronounce
the death penalty only upon the unanimous recom-
mendation of the jury.9" Utah appears to be the
"State v. Dickerson, __A.2d_ (Del. 1972).
81 Id. at _.
"6 Knowlton, Problems of Jury Discretion it Capital
Cases, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 1099 (1953). A similar analy-
sis can be found in MODEL PEN CODE, App. D, 125
(Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959). The major policy considera-
tions against permitting the judge to overrule the jury
are summarized in the commentary to ABA PROJECT
ON MINDnM- STANDA Ds FoR CRMINAL JUsTIcE,
STANDARDS RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTENATIVES
AND PROCEDURES 47 (Approved Draft, 1968).
.7 The New York statute was subsequently amended
so as to repeal this feature; see note 91 and accompany-
ing text infra. The history of New York law on this
point is traced in People v. Fitzpatrick, 61 Misc. 2d
1043, 308 N.Y.S.2d 18, motion denied 34 App. Div. 2d
730, 311 N.Y.S.2d 577, appeal dismissed, 27 N.Y.2d
742, 314 N.Y.S.2d 992, 263 N.E. 2d 390 (1970).
$'The Delaware statute is DEL. CODE ANN. § 3901
(1953) which however was recently held unconstitu-
tional; see notes 84-86 and accompanying text supra.
"The Utah statute is UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-30-4
(1953).
"0 The South Dakota statute is S.D. COMPILED LAWS
ANN. § 22-16-13 (1967).
9" N.Y. PENAL LAw §§ 125.30, 125.35 (McKinney,
1967). See also note 87 supra.
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only other jurisdiction, besides Florida under the
new statute, authorizing the judge to impose a
death sentence after the jury has recommended
mercy.
Appellate Review Following Imposition of the Death
Penalty
Pre-Furman Florida law permitted an appeal
from the trial court to the Florida supreme court,
as a matter of right, in all cases where the death
penalty was imposed' The supreme court reviewed
the determination of guilt, but could not reduce
the sentence as being excessive, so long as the
sentence was permissible under the statute. The
new law provides automatic review by the supreme
court, promptly after the trial, and the supreme
court now reviews the sentence as well as the
determination of guilt. 3
By providing for review of the sentence, the
new law evidently requires the supreme court to
review the trial court's findings of the existence of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and the
process by which the trial court determined that
the mitigating circumstances, if any, were not suf-
ficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstances.
The statute contains no guidelines for the exer-
cise of the supreme court's appellate function. We
may wonder, for example, whether the supreme
court will sustain the trial court upon a finding of
"substantial evidence", even though the supreme
court might have reached the opposite result in a
hearing de novo.9 Further, we may ask whether
2 See notes 8-10 and accompanying text supra.
93 The difference between "automatic review by the
Supreme Court" in the new statute and the "appeal as
a matter of right to the Supreme Court" in the old
statute is by no means clear, especially as the Florida
Constitution confers jurisdiction upon the supreme
court in language identical to the old statute. This
question could only arise in the highly unlikely event
that a person who had been sentenced to death made
no attempt to appeal to the supreme court. The court
would then have to decide whether to entertain "auto-
matic review" without an active appellant. Under both
old and new statutes, if the sentence is not death,
appeal is taken from the trial court to the district court
of appeals. See note 10 supra.
" In Nelson v. State ex rd. Quigg, 156 Fla. 189, 191,
23 So.2d 136, 136-37 (1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 390
(1946), the court noted the "almost universal rule,
that the findings of fact made by an administrative
board, bureau or commission, in compliance with law,
will not be disturbed on appeal if such findings are
sustained by substantial evidence.. . . This rule finds
its counterpart in, if indeed it is not the twin brother
of, the rule which requires an appellate court to give
great weight to the findings of fact made by a jury or
a chancellor and to sustain such findings unless there
is no substantial evidence to support them."
the supreme court should be influenced by the cir-
cumstance, where it exists, of a disagreement be-
tween the trial judge and jury.95
The uncertainties in the statutory procedures
for the trial court are, therefore, compounded by
uncertainties in the scope of appellate review by
the Florida supreme court. The statute vests a
significant amount of discretion in that court, to
the extent that it possesses almost as much dis-
cretion as if the statute simply authorized the
supreme court to grant mercy in its discretion.
The extent of the supreme court's discretion under
the new statute raises additional questions under
Furman, and may subject the supreme court to an
unwelcome new responsibility.
Lack of Change in Procedure at Other Stages of the
-System
The memorandum submitted in October 1972
by the legal advisory staff of the Governor's
Committee suggested that, in order to stand even a
theoretical chance of satisfying constitutional
standards, a system of capital punishment "would
necessarily include provisions designed to elimi-
nate, as far as humanly possible, the risk of arbi-
trary, freakish or discriminatory decision in capital
cases, not only in the jury function, but at all
stages of the process where substantial discretion
now exists." 1 As examples of areas of substantial
discretion, the memorandum mentioned executive
clemency, jury discretion to convict of a lesser
offense, and plea bargaining to lesser included
offenses.Y These examples were not intended to be
an exhaustive listing; additional discretionary
functions readily come to mind, including the
prosecutor's decision whether or not to prosecute
and, if so, what offense to charge and what penalty
to suggest; the grand jury function; and the avail-
ability and sufficiency of defense counsel beyond
the bare minimum required to meet constitutional
or statutory requirements.
Amongst these discretionary functions, executive
clemency occupies a unique position, since it is
exercised by the Governor and members of the
cabinet on the basis of authority specifically pro-
vided in the Florida Constitution 8 It cannot
05 The concept is well settled in administrative law,
e.g., Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474
(1951), and may be appropriate for consideration in
the appellate review of sentencing.
98 Ehrhardt, supra note 33, at 6.
9 7 Id.
98 FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 8 (1968).
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therefore be controlled by statute. It could, and
arguably should, be controlled by quasi-legislative
acts of the executive, announcing procedures and
standards so as to accomplish a voluntary self-
limitation of the future exercise of clemency in
individual cases. 99 The other areas of discretion
seem amenable to statutory control.
The new Florida capital punishment statute
makes no attempt at limiting discretion at any
stage of the process except sentencing. The statute
thereby fails to respond adequately to the require-
ments of Furman, as we interpret them.
Parole Restrictions
The new Florida statute contains a provision,
without equivalent in prior law, requiring at least
twenty-five years of imprisonment to be served
before eligibility for parole, by defendants whose
lives have been spared after conviction of a capital
felony. 1"' This provision inevitably puts pressure
on the pardon and commutation power of the
executive, which is not restricted-and indeed
could not be restricted"'-by the statute. Prisoners
confined under the twenty-five year no-parole
sentence will obviously seek executive clemency as
a means of reducing the length of time to be served.
The prospect of this pressure on the executive
clemency function emphasizes the need previously
noted,"° for executive development of guidelines
for the exercise of clemency.
Moreover, the twenty-five year no-parole sen-
tence raises serious penological questions. Correc-
tions officials testified to the Governor's Committee
that lifetime imprisonment, without any possi-
bility of parole, would seriously prejudice prison
administration, since inmates would be unmanage-
able. 03 The officials also testified that, by the time
an inmate has been imprisoned for twenty years,
he is likely to be either a vegetable or a maniac,
and in any event hardly fit for release. 04 The
91 See generally K. DAvis, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE
126-41, 221-22 (1969).
100 Florida Capital Punishment Act § 2 (amending
FLA. STATS. § 775.082 as amended by ch. 72-118, [1972]
Fla. Sess. Laws 258).
1"' See note 98 and accompanying text supra.
'12 See note 99 and accompanying text supra.
0' Statement by Louie L. Wainwright, Director,
Florida Division of Corrections, to the Governor's
Committee to Study Capital Punishment, August 17,
1972, in Tallahassee, Florida. Mr. Wainwright's views
were supported by testimony of Armond R. Cross,
Chairman, Florida Parole and Probation Commission,
id.
104These observations were made in response to
questions at the meeting of the committee cited in note
twenty-five year no-parole sentence therefore is
likely to result either in the release of inmates
after that length of time, in a deteriorated condi-
tion with a strong potential of danger to society,
or in the imprisonment of inmates for their entire
lives, since after twenty-five years they will be
found unfit for release.
The Life Felony Classification
The new statute creates the life felony, a new
classification relating to offenses less serious than
capital felonies but more serious than felonies of
the first degree."' The life felony carries imprison-
ment for life, or for a term of years not less than
thirty; parole is not precluded. Some felonies which
were previously capital are reduced to life felo-
nies."'6
It is questionable whether this additional classifi-
cation of offenses is needed. The felony of the first
degree carries a maximum term of thirty years or,
when specifically provided by statute, life im-
prisonment.l°7 Prisoners seldom serve the full term
of their sentences, since they are generally released
on parole after serving only a portion of it"'s-
and, as pointed out above, corrections officials
oppose imprisonment for terms as long as twenty
years. In view of current practices with regard to
parole, the distinction between the penalties for
life felony and felony of the first degree seems
minimal.
Committee Support for The New Statute
The report issued by the Governor's Committee
to Study Capital Punishment deals almost ex-
clusively with the single question whether capital
punishment should be reinstated. The committee's
report did not address itself to the other matters
in the Executive Order which created the com-
mittee, since no sighificant amount of information
had been received on anything other than the
103 supra, attended by one of the authors of this
article, and are not recorded in these terms in the report
of the committee. Newspaper reports of the legislative
debate on the twenty-five year no-parole provision
are to the same effect. \See, e.g., St. Petersburg (Fla.)
Times, Dec. 2, 1972, at 1-A.
05 Florida Capital Punishment Act §§ 1 (amending
FLA. STATS. § 775.081 (1971)) and 2 (amending FLA.
STATS. § 775.082, as amended by ch. 72-118, [1972] Fla.
Sess. Laws 258).
106 Notes 70-75 and accompanying text supra.
10 FLA. STATS. § 775.082 (2)(a) (1971).
10 Cross, supra note 103, notes that "The average
length of time served on [life] sentence before parole
release is granted is 9.55 years."
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question of reinstating capital punishment. The
House Select Committee on the Death Penalty
prepared a brief report, which focused primarily
on the sentencing procedure which should be
adopted when capital punishment was reinstated.
The Senate Council on Criminal Justice filed no
report at all, other than the draft of legislation it
recommended.
Thus the new Florida capital punishment statute
is supported by committee reports only in one
respect-on the question whether to reinstate
capital punishment. No part of the committee
reports provides significant information on the
other matters dealt with in the statute such as
sentencing procedure, appellate review, minimum
sentence without parole. The lack of committee
work products on these crucial questions became
especially unforunate when the Senate-House con-
ference committee met during the final night of the
legislative session to draft a compromise bill.
Many of the deficiencies in the statute might well
have been remedied at that time if the conference
committee had the benefit of adequate reports
containing information about experience in other
jurisdictions, surveys of professional and scholarly
literature, testimony from experts, and alternative
solutions.
CONCLUSION
Although seriously defective, the statute enacted
during the legislature's whirl-wind four day special
session appears to have placated the proponents of
reinstatement of capital punishment. Doubts about
the constitutionality of the statute were frequently
expressed, but seldom as criticisms of the new
statute or its authors." 9 The Tampa Tribune
observed editorially:
Justices of the Supreme Court in their readiness to
bend the Constitution to fit their own sentiments
may find the new Florida law as invalid as the old.
But, if so, some of the responsibility for the callous
killings of innocent citizens will rest with the
Court, not with Governor Askew and the Legisla-
ture. They have fashioned a fair method for
punishing the guilty and deterring the potential
killer.UO
Thus, constitutional problems were brushed
aside by Florida lawmakers and other leaders of
opinion. The capital punishment statute seems to
have been an expedient response to election-time
politics rather than a sound response to the con-
stitutional and penological needs of the state."'
The need remains as great after enactment of this
statute as before for comprehensive study and re-
form of our entire system of criminal justice and
corrections.
105 See, e.g., Miami (Fla.) Herald, Dec. 3, 1972, at
1-B; St. Petersburg (Fla.) Times, Dec. 4, 1972, at 1-B.
The only editorial criticism in a major Florida news-
paper the authors could locate was in the St. Petersburg
(Fla.) Times, Dec. 2, 1972, at 16-A:
Askew should, but no doubt won't, veto the com-
promise death penalty bill which fails to fully
conform to the standards he proposed .... It is
up to Askew, or the U.S. Supreme Court, to correct
the Legislature's hastily written mistake.
110 Tampa (Fla.) Tribune, Dec. 2, 1972, at 14-A.
"I This discussion raises problems of legislative
ethics, a subject beyond the scope of the present article.
